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The United States Distant Water Fishing
Industry and the United Nations Law
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INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of the United States fishing industry and its relationship to the present United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) must commence with an understanding of the importance of that industry. The U.S. fishing industry is a primary source
of food-a real and immediate human need. Despite this important
position, there are other issues at UNCLOS which have attracted
considerably more attention than fishing. For the United States, the
fishing issue is domestically complicated because its fishing industry is
complex and multifaceted- composed of segments with divergent
positions on the U.S. stance at UNCLOS. On any given issue, conflicting perspectives may develop between the U.S. coastal fishermen
and the U.S. distant water fishing fleets.' Divergent positions are a
natural outgrowth of the differences in type and location of fishing
activities.
* J.D. Washington and Lee University School of Law, 1964; B.S. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1961; Mr. Utz is a partner in the
Washington D.C. law firm Steele & Utz. Mr. Utz gratefully acknowledges the able
assistance of Mr. Stuart Weinstein-Bacal and Mr. Ronald Nelson.

1. The coastal water interests would devise a more rigid, exclusive control by
the coastal nation; while distant water fishermen would see such U.S. action as precipitating similar action by foreign nations against U.S. flag vessels operating off their
coasts. Essentially, the distant water fleets desire minimal fishing fees and the coastal
interests favor maximum fishing fees.
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Prior to the convening of UNCLOS the U.S. fishing industry was
asked by the U.S. government, primarily through the Department of
State, to bring together the various interests of U.S. fishermen and
develop a comprehensive fisheries negotiating position acceptable to
all segments of the industry. Fishermen realized the importance to
themselves, to the nation, and to the world of developing a program
which would provide order in the utilization of the oceans. With this
in mind, representatives of U.S. fishing industry interests formulated
a workable solution to the fishing problems. Pursuant to intensive
effort on the part of these representatives, a comprehensive program
which not only seemed workable but also biologically sound 2 was
reached. The plan was the "species approach" to the living resources
of the sea.
THE SPECIES APPROACH

The species approach plan provided that each coastal state develop and manage the individual species of marine life off of its coast.
Different standards and criteria for each species were to be established concerning access to the fishery and the actual fishing
methods. Standards were to be based on the population and biological limits of a particular species and to be tailored to compensate for
3
differing characteristics of the many diverse species of fish.
This plan not only offered protection to the near shore fisheries
but also the flexibility required for the distant water interests. For
example, tuna is a highly migratory species not easily controlled by
any one coastal nation. Under the species approach an international
commission would be set up to manage such fisheries. On the other
hand, shrimp are not highly migratory. Therefore, distant water
shrimpers could look, on a case by case basis, to what degree of fish-

2. The plan was based on a biological view of the fishery. The biology of each
harvested species was to be considered in determining the required management
techniques. The management was not limited by zones of control.
3. Obviously the harvestable stocks of the world have different life cycles. Some
species, such as tuna and mackerel, migrate over far reaching stretches of the high
seas and coastal waters of the world. Other species are anadromous, spawning in
fresh waters and spending most of their lives in the salt water of the oceans. Salmon,
which range from the coastal waters to the high seas, exemplify this type of fish.
Eels, which spawn at sea and then migrate to fresh water, are, on the other hand,
catadromous. Some species are primarily coastal-reproducing, living and dying relatively near shore, i.e., shrimp, menhaden, and flounder. Standards for the management of any particular species must be dependent upon the particular life cycle of
that species.

COMMENT: DISTANT WATER FISHING

ing would be conducive to any particular shrimp population being
considered for harvest. Guidelines for the management of that population would be developed in conjunction with the country off of
whose coast the resource exists, that is, the coastal state.
The species approach plan would give the coastal state powers
over these species similar to the powers provided in the 200 mile
zone by the United States Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(FCMA).4 However, under a zone type plan, the coastal state would
have the initial authority to manage a species only within a certain
distance from shore. A management scheme based strictly on a 200
mile zone would provide limited effectiveness in managing far ranging
species. This limitation provided the impetus for the industry's
species approach proposal. If a species ranged beyond 200 miles,
under the species approach, the coastal state would still exercise
primary management authority. Of course, there would be some limitations on this authority. Strict guidelines for coastal states would be
required to ensure equitable application of management plans. Some
resources would require special management vehicles, such as an international commission, or possibly bilateral or multilateral agreements among affected nations.
The species approach was painstakingly developed by the U.S.
fishing industry despite the inherent conflicts between coastal and
distant-water fisheries. The predominant importance of this compromise was that it developed a management program acceptable to
all U.S. fishing interests. Without that compromise the United States
position at UNCLOS would have been weakened by divergent interests, and the quibbling which would have accompanied them.
Realistically, economics would demand protection of the shrimp,
tuna, and salmon segments of the U.S. industry at the expense of the
coastal fisheries because those distant water fleets are the largest
money producers. 5 Instead, a united industry offered the species
approach in an effort to protect, as much as possible, all segments of
the U.S. fishing industry.

4. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
Stat. 331 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FCMA].
5. The dollar value of the shrimp, tuna, and salmon catch exceeds fifty percent
of the total dollar value for the total U.S. catch. See U.S. Department of Commerce,
Current Fishery Statistics No. 7200, Fisheries of the United States, 1976 1-10 (Apr.
1977).
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Little remains of the species approach plan. The text of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)6 which concerns living resources bears little resemblance to the initial plan worked out by the
U.S. fishing industry. The approach embodied in the ICNT is the 200
mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The species approach was not
adopted at UNCLOS.
THE EEZ APPROACH

The present text of the ICNT setting forth the EEZ approach
creates various problems for the industry. Areas of particular concern
include control over the extended jurisdictional zones, determination
and allocation of surplus resources, and dispute settlement. An overall evaluation of the ICNT from the U.S. fishing industry's perspective leads to the conclusion that UNCLOS is doing nothing to benefit
the U.S. fishing industry-especially the distant water fishermen.
Control
Unfortunately, the current text sets up the EEZ as a zone
scheme with management tied primarily to distance rather than individual species. The control to be exercised by the coastal state in this
200 mile zone has been a point of contention since the beginning of
the conference. As early as the Caracas meeting 7 representatives of
various developing countries, especially the Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
(CEP) Group, claimed that they intended to exercise sovereign rights
within their 200 mile zones. These countries felt no obligation to respect the EEZ guidelines proposed by other nations. Some of the
developing countries felt that the guidelines established in the United
States domestic plan (FCMA)8 were protective of the interests of the
developed countries at the expense of the stated goal of the
conference-protecting the interests of mankind. These nations argued that the developed countries were not interested in successfully
protecting living resources during their development period, when it
was to their benefit to take optimum advantage of the resources

6. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, July 15, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/VP. 10/Part V (1977). [hereinafter cited as ICNTI.
7. UNCLOS III began with a short organizational meeting in New York City in
December 1973. Substantive work started on June 20, 1974, in Caracas, Venezuela.
The Caracas meeting was followed by meetings in Geneva in 1975, in New York in
1976 and 1977, and in Geneva and New York in 1978.
8. FCMA, supra note 4, §§ 201, 301.
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within their EEZ and to pollute the water and air 9 without limitations.
Another major problem the fishing industry has in accepting the
ICNT concerns coastal management control over the EEZ. With the
authority to manage the resources off its coasts, the coastal state
necessarily has a responsibility for effective management that cannot
be undertaken lightly. Management will be a precise and complicated
process imposing foremost a duty to consider the best interests of any
particular fishery. The coastal state's fishermen will have first priority
access to any fisheries resource. After the optimum yield is determined by the coastal state, that managing state will make any existing
surplus available to other nations.' 0 This plan presents two major
points for dispute: (1) determination of the existence of any surplus,
and (2) determination of the allocation.

Surplus Determination
The ICNT provides that "the coastal state shall determine the
allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic
zone.""
The coastal states are also directed to "promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone."1 2 When a coastal state does not have the capacity
to harvest the entire allowable catch, as determined by that coastal
state, it "shall, through agreements or other arrangement . . ., give
other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch."1 3 These
provisions are of no significant benefit to the distant water fishing
interests since the coastal state determines the allowable catch, its
own capacity, and finally, the amount of surplus, if any. Coastal states
can be expected to utilize their own scientific data rather than refer
to United States or world organizational sources such as the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 14 Challenges

9. This claim is based on the fact that today's developed countries reached their
present success by exploiting the resources of the world without conservational and
environmental restrictions. These restrictions are now advantageous to the "user"
countries and are being urged upon the developing countries. Therefore, the developing countries argue that they are being asked to carry an unfairly heavy load as
they strive for development.
10. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 62, para. 2.
11. Id. art. 61, para. 1.
12. Id. art. 62, para. 1.
13. Id. art, 62, para. 2.
14. Whether based on national pride, embarassment, or opportunism, nations
may reject outside data especially wh en rejection is in their own self interest.
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to a coastal state's determination of these factors will take years; even
the determinations are patently absurd. In the interim, U.S. distant
water fishermen, if precluded from the fishery, could go into bankruptcy. Article 62(3) of the ICNT is particularly troublesome in granting access to the resources of the EEZ. The coastal state "shall take
into account all relevant factors including, inter alia, the significance
of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal state
concerned and its other national interests ... "15 "Other national
interests" is nothing more than a concession to the politicians. Such
wording reflects a belief by some that the fishing issue is too politically strategic to leave to fishermen and economists. 16 No one in the
industry is satisfied with this sort of provision.
Undeniably, fisheries issues have been discussed at UNCLOS,
and some consider the pertinent text of the ICNT successful. Indeed,
there may be a success in that the Conference reached a tentative
agreement. Those directly concerned-the U.S. fishermen- realize,
however, that the conference has gained little for them. The United
States will have the most scientifically accurate statistics in the world
and can be expected to be honest with them. There may be some
politics involved in allocating surplus, but actual determination of
surplus off the coast of the United States will certainly be sound. This
will not be the case for other coastal states with little or no statistical
information and no propensity to utilize outside data.
An excellent example of the surplus problem can be illustrated
by examining a relatively recent bilateral treaty between the United
States and Mexico concerning fishing matters. 17 Mexico contended
in the initial discussions that it was capable of harvesting the entire
allowable catch of shrimp off of its coast. The Mexican delegation
explained how this Mexican harvest could be accomplished. The U.S.
fishing industry noted that Mexico's allegations were an expectation,
and not factually related to what really was being harvested by that
coastal state. In answer to these doubts, Mexico claimed that approximately one hundred Mexican boats would be added to the fishery
the following year. That treaty is now three years old and there has
been no increased Mexican effort. This example demonstrates that
under this bilateral agreement, or even the present ICNT provisions,

15. ICNT, supra note 6, art. 62, para. 3.
16. See note 20 infra.
17. Fisheries Agreement, Nov. 24, 1976, United States-Mexico, T.I.A.S. No.
8853.
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the U.S. distant water industry is virtually at the mercy of the controlling coastal state.
The United States 200 mile legislation recognizes traditional fishing rights 18 but under the ICNT other coastal states are not bound
by this concept. 19 The coastal states may claim that there is no
surplus, or, as in the case of Mexico, by professing a future increased
effort may otherwise preclude foreign fishing activity in their coastal
zones. Under the treaty with Mexico, U.S. fishermen will be
excluded from the Mexican shrimp fishery by 1980 despite the
surplus of shrimp which scientists from the United States have ample
statistics to establish. In fact, at one negotiating session, Mexican sciscientists until the head of the
entists agreed with the United States
20
Mexican delegation stopped them.
Surplus Allocation
If a coastal state does determine that there is a surplus of a given
resource, the question then becomes who may harvest the surplus.
The U.S. distant water industry is, of course, dependent on the traditional right concept. There has been considerable resistance at the
conference to any rigid guidelines concerning the allocation and division of such a surplus. Rigid guidelines would take into account such
factors as (1) length of time in the fishery, (2) capital expended for the
fishery, and (3) other related considerations. Realistically, it may be
more politically beneficial for a coastal nation to favor certain newcomers than to allow fishing access to a country that has previously
fished in the area. Without rigid guidelines the fishermen that have
developed the fishery and fishing equipment over a period of years
may suddenly be excluded from a fishery that was once a high seas
fishery and upon which the traditional fisherman has staked his life's
work. This prospect of exclusion does nto place the U.S. distant water
fisherman in an enviable position. U.S. fishing interests have been
informed by U.S. State Department officials that rigid guidelines concerning priority of access to surplus fishing harvests were not saleable
at UNCLOS. This outcome of the allocation issue signifies a loss for
the U.S. fishermen at the UNCLOS conference.
18. FCMA, supra note 4, § 201(d).
19. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text does not require consideration of
traditional fishing other than minimizing economic dislocation. ICNT, supra note 2,
art. 62, para. 3.
20. Agreement between U.S. scientists and their Mexican counterparts was
squelched by the head of the Mexican delegation who stated that the surplus issue
was not to be left to scientists and fishermen but to politicians.
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The EEZ management plan is certain to have a profound secondary impact on the U.S. fishing industry as a whole. Likely effects on
the shrimp industry are illustrative. A 200 mile EEZ off Brazil and
Mexico will probably exclude U.S. fishermen from those areas and
thereby eliminate a healthy portion of the shrimp production of the
United States. The displaced U.S. fishing boats will be forced back
into the U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico, creating an overabundance of boats in an economic, although not necessarily in a biologi21
cal, sense.
U.S. shrimp boats which regularly shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico
have always operated in the U.S. Gulf except during "slow" periods.
During these periods U.S. shrimpers generally migrate to the Mexican Gulf and shrimp fifteen to thirty miles off shore. Although the
catch in the Mexican waters comprises a relatively small proportion of
the total U.S. shrimp catch, this Mexican fishery is important to the
U.S. industry because it makes up a substantial part of the total
shrimp catch during the slow periods. This catch keeps the processing
plants fully operational and the shrimp boats running during the slack
time. A 200 mile EEZ coupled with the expected exclusion of U.S.
shrimpers from the fisheries off areas of South America and Mexico
will force these distant water and Gulf shrimpers back into the U.S.
Gulf year around. This may have disastrous effects for processing
plants during slack periods. Since the distant water shrimpers traditionally have large, modern, and efficient boats, the real losers under
the EEZ approach will be the smaller and less efficient producersthe "Ma and Pa" operators. Given the limited fishing area in the U.S.
portion of the Gulf, the small operator will not only be at a disadvantage in head to head competition with incoming distant water boats,
but if he has a breakdown or delay in operations, the small producer
will not only lose what he would have caught during the delay, but
he may also face a fished out resource on his return. As a result of
the EEZ approach, the U.S. shrimping industry may be forced into a
graduated scale of success for its participants. The most productive
fleets which formerly fished off foreign coasts will catch shrimp; the
next plateau of shrimpers will catch fewer shrimp; the next lower
group, much fewer; and the lowest level, the least productive, will
likely go out of business.
21. Shrimp cannot be overfished, in the normal sense of the term, because of the
shrimp life cycle. If the shrimp are harvested off of the coast after the eggs are laid,
the young will be safe in the estuarine areas. Even if all of the adults are taken, the
young will mature and continue the cycle the next year. The really limiting factors on
the shrimp population are the pollution and weather in the estuary.
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The potentiality of business failure illuminates another problem
confronting the U.S. fishing industry-the need for stability. In order
to recommend the industry to investors the financial community,
which unfortunately considers the fishing industry from the same
perspective as it would a land based industry, requires assurance as
to the stability of the U.S. fishing industry. The assurance might be
forthcoming were order established under an UNCLOS treaty, but
uncertainties built into the fishing articles of the ICNT provide little
reason for confidence. The impending exclusion of U.S. distant water
fishermen from their traditional fishing areas does not create an atmosphere of stability for the industry.
Despite the prospects of the EEZ scheme, there may still be
cause for measured optimism. Joint venture operations provide one
possible opportunity for the fishing industry. Even Brazil, which
claims a 200 mile territorial sea, has proposed a joint venture scheme.
The plan is rather restrictive and non-Brazilian participation is limited
to forty-nine percent of the voting stockholders.22 Additionally, the
Fishermen's Protective ACt2 3 offers remedial assistance but is a stopgap measure which may have limited applicability after an UNCLOS
treaty. 24 Other means of stabilizing the prospects of the U.S. distant
water industry are needed. An UNCLOS treaty with rigid guidelines
could have enhanced the future of U.S. distant water fishing interests.

Dispute Settlement
International political machinations have so permeated the
UNCLOS that the fishing industry has become a thorn under the
saddle of this elite political interest troop. The loose provisions of the
ICNT are sufficient evidence of the high politicization of the negotiat-

22. The proposed Brazilian plan also limits majority control to natural-born Brazsiljan citizens. The vessels used in the fishery would be required to fly the Brazilian
flag. This would preclude the use of vessels of U.S. ownership and registry. Generally, the proposal is that the entire operation be Brazilian.
23. Basically this Act provides for reimbursement to U.S. fishermen for charges
paid to foreign governments for the release of the fishermen's seized fishing vessels.
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1972 (Supp. V 1975).
24. Presumably, after order to the oceans is finally recognized, all jurisdictional
claims will be standardized and there will be very few seizures based on the jurisdictional claims of a foreign country which are not officially recognized by the U.S.
Government.
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ing process. 25 The loose wording of parts of the fishery-related provisions of the ICNT leads to yet another problem-dispute settlement. For example, concerning the conservation of living resources:
"Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore population of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yields, as qualified by relevant environmental and
economic factors . . ."; 26 or concerning the above mentioned utilization article "the coastal state shall take into account . . . its other national interests .... "27 Litigation, arbitration, or concilliation over
the meaning of these articles could be extremely lengthy, assuming
even the existence of a judicial body with proper jurisdiction.
Whether such a court exists is a vital issue because dispute settle28
ment for fishing questions is not yet clearly settled in the ICNT.
CONCLUSION

From the point of view of the U.S. distant water fishing industhere
are several problems in the general approach taken by the
try,
UNCLOS. First, there were too many issues on the negotiating table.
Second, the issues were not systematically considered, not merely
because of the great number of issues but because many unnecessary
or inappropriate issues detracted from the consideration of the important ones. From the commencement of preliminary discussion and
throughout the conferences, the straits issue occupied an inordinate
amount of negotiating time, 2 9 not only for the United States but for

25. Many of the phrases used in the ICNT are in reality political loopholes. The
*'other national interests" phrase of article 62 is an example. The term is ambiguous.
Often a lack of specificity in the text leaves much room for creative interpretations.
The absence of guidelines for surplus determination and allocation in articles 61 and
62 is an example of this and shows the politicization of the conference,
26. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 61, para. 3.
27. Id. art. 62, para. 3.
28. There has been divergence of opinion as to the applicability of the dispute
settlement provisions of the ICNT (article 296) to fishing disputes. Negotiating Group
5 met after the 1978 Geneva UNCLOS to work on this question. The resultant proposal would require conciliation in cases of inadequate conservation and management
measures and also in cases of a coastal state's refusal to determine or allocate a
surplus. A final agreement on dispute settlement in the area of fishing questions has
yet to be reached. Even accepting the proposal, many questions concerning disputes
still remain. See Chairman's Suggestion for a Compromise Formula U.N. Doc.
5/16 (1978), reprinted in Results of the Work of the Negotiating Group on Item
(5) of Document A/Conf. 62/62 in Reports Document 100-06 GE 78-85880 (19 May
1978).
29. Fishing interests have always felt that the Conference was an improper forum
for discussion of the straits question because (1) straits have always been traditional
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all of the major maritime states. The straits issue, in particular,
should not have been brought into the bargaining process, since discussion of the issue greatly detracted from the resolution of questions
more properly before the conference. The straits issue became so important in the minds of the United States delegation that all else
seemed subject to sacrifice.
Because of the undue emphasis on this issue the fishing industry
was consistently requested to retreat from its already compromised
position. On one occasion the industry was asked to develop a compromise position to entice certain countries to the table. The industry
representatives literally worked all night to prepare a position paper,
which required tough compromises from the industry. Even before
the relevant nations responded to this initiative, a softer position was
requested by the U.S. delegation leaders. Typically, the United
States was too quick to compromise the interests of the U.S. fishing
industry.30 Consequently the fishing interests of the United States
appear to be valued only as a bargaining chip at UNCLOS. The compendium of politically imperative issues which fill the ICNT submerges such essential questions as fishing rights.
While UNCLOS has been a wonderful forum for meeting people
and exchanging views, an overall analysis reveals minimum benefit to
the United States. The Conference to date has been preoccupied with
myriad issues-providing a field day for international procrastinators
and legal sleight of hand artists. This is tremendously frustrating to
those who came to the conference with hopes of solving problems and
establishing an order to the oceans. UNCLOS is, indeed, an opportunity that should not be wasted. To this point, however, the results
of the conference are less than satisfactory, especially in the eyes of
the U.S. distant water fishermen.

international waterways, (2) no country is in a position to unilaterally change this
tradition and attempt to prohibit straits transit by the major powers, and (3) the
straits are not "resources" in the spirit of UNCLOS. Also, the U.S. fisherman, being
rather straightforward in their basic approach to the Conference, would invariably
point out conflicts and inconsistencies in the U.S. position on straits.
30. Another example of the U.S. delegation's use of the U.S. fishing interests as a
pawn at UNCLOS concerned the U.S. domestic 200 mile legislation. At one point
the industry was asked to exert maximum lobbying efforts to hold up the 200 mile
legislation because the U.S. delegation felt it was detrimental to negotiations at the
Conference. Industry representatives went to great lengths to stall that legislation.
Inexplicably on that same day the U.S. delegation accepted the 200 mile EEZ.

